// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Verification of builtin signatures * * Copyright 2019 Google LLC */ /* * This file implements verification of fs-verity builtin signatures. Please * take great care before using this feature. It is not the only way to do * signatures with fs-verity, and the alternatives (such as userspace signature * verification, and IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the * limitations of this feature, see Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. */ #include "fsverity_private.h" #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/verification.h> /* * /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures * If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature. */ int fsverity_require_signatures; /* * Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates. * * Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use * keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions. */ static struct key *fsverity_keyring; /** * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature * @vi: the file's fsverity_info * @signature: the file's built-in signature * @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature * * If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it * against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. * * Note that signatures are verified regardless of the state of the * 'fsverity_require_signatures' variable, and the LSM subsystem relies on this * behavior to help enforce file integrity policies. (See * fsverity_report_valid_sig(), which assumes that the signature, if present, * was verified here.) Please discuss changes with the LSM list (thank you!). * * Return: 0 if the signature is present and valid, or absent and not required; * -errno on failure */ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size) { const struct inode *inode = vi->inode; const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d; int err; if (sig_size == 0) { if (fsverity_require_signatures) { fsverity_err(inode, "require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!"); return -EPERM; } return 0; } if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) { /* * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used. * In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an * error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the * PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to * distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack * surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be * reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. */ fsverity_err(inode, "fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!"); return -ENOKEY; } d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!d) return -ENOMEM; memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8); d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs); d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size); memcpy(d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size); err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, signature, sig_size, fsverity_keyring, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); kfree(d); if (err) { if (err == -ENOKEY) fsverity_err(inode, "File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring"); else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED) fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature"); else if (err == -EBADMSG) fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature"); else fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature", err); return err; } return 0; } /* * If the signature exists, this tells the LSM that it was verified. * * fsverity_verify_signature() must have already been called with the same * signature, *and* the inode must have verity enabled with the signature * matching it. If called from FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, the latter means that we * must be past the point of no return, i.e. verity won't fail to be enabled at * a later point. This is critical, since LSMs must be told about the signature * only when the verity status is permanent in the in-core inode. */ void fsverity_report_valid_sig(const struct inode *inode, const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size) { int err; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_VERITY(inode))) return; if (sig_size == 0) return; err = security_inode_setintegrity( inode, LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID, signature, sig_size); if (err) fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs", err); /* * Besides the logging above, ignore errors here. The LSM hook just * records the signature and doesn't perform access control. And in the * case of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY verity was already enabled. */ } void __init fsverity_init_signature(void) { fsverity_keyring = keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(fsverity_keyring)) panic("failed to allocate \".fs-verity\" keyring"); key_register_fs_verity_keyring(fsverity_keyring); }